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Abstract  
Lo scopo del presente elaborato è di presentare il modello della rational addiction sviluppato 
da Gary S. Becker e Kevin M. Murphy, in opposizione a quelle che erano le teorie 
precedentemente accettate da un lato, alla luce delle successive rielaborazioni dall’altro, in 
particolare per quanto riguarda le sue applicazioni empiriche e il problema delle time-
inconsistent preferences. 
L’elaborato procede esponendo le caratteristiche ed implicazioni del modello per poi riportare 
i risultati dei numerosi studi empirici che, nel corso dei decenni successivi, hanno avvalorato 
o talvolta indebolito le conclusioni raggiunte da Becker e Murphy. 
Nella seconda parte dell’elaborato si presentano i dati del rapporto dello European School 
Survey Project on Alcohol and other Drugs (ESPAD) del 2007 e si riportano alcune 
correlazioni individuate che, lungi dal voler avvalorare o smentire le implicazioni del 
modello, possono mostrare affinità con esso. 
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I. Introduction 
The rational addiction model finds its roots in the paper De gustibus not est disputandum by 
George J. Stigler and Gary S. Becker, published in the American Economic Review in 1977. 
Although the expression rational addiction is never used in it, being its main topic the 
stability of tastes over time, the paper draws a new and revolutionary approach to behaviours 
such as habits, fashions and addictions, which had long been considered inconsistent with the 
rational choice model. What Stigler and Becker claim instead, is that such behaviours can be 
explained within the rational utility-maximizing framework and that it is neither necessary nor 
useful to develop a separate theory. 
 
This new approach was then developed in a path-breaking article by Becker and Kevin M. 
Murphy: A theory of rational addiction, published in the Journal of Political Economy in 
1988. 
Before the introduction of this model, other studies by Pollak (1970,1976) had analysed habits 
and addictions regarding them as non-rational and therefore using a myopic model of 
consumption to explain them. Pollak, in particular, stressed the necessity to introduce a 
distinction between short-run and long-run demand functions, pointing out that, among other 
reasons (the consumer might have contractually fixed commitments or he might be ignorant 
of some consumption possibilities), some goods could be considered habit forming, in a way 
to make individual’s current preferences dependant on the past consumption patterns. The 
main implication of Pollak theory is that ceteris paribus, a higher level of past consumption 
of a habit forming good results in a higher level of current consumption. 
What later studies by Ryder and Heal (1973), Boyer (1978), and Spinnewyn (1979) showed 
however, was that Pollak theory, although successful in recognizing the complementarity of 
choices among time, did not take into account that in the same way past consumption affects 
current consumption, future consumption and future prices may have an influence on current 
choices too. This is the reason why models such as Pollak’s one are called myopic, meaning 
that they are based on the assumption that individuals ignore the future when making their 
decisions. It needs to be stressed that the myopic models do not fail to take into account the 
future simply by mistake, on the contrary, they are based on the very notion that consumers 
are naive and not aware of the habit-forming effect of current consumption, or that they 
simply ignore it.  
 
In the Becker-Murphy model the term rationality implies a consistent plan to maximize utility 
over time as individuals anticipate the future consequences of their choices. Therefore, 
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addictions, even strong ones, are not regarded as something irrational: they are the result of a 
forward-looking maximization with stable preferences. In other words, individuals do 
recognize the addictive nature of the choices they make, but they still make them because the 
total gain form the activity exceeds the total costs of it. 
The rational addiction model has gradually became the standard approach to the consumption 
of addictive goods. Its rapid acceptance is due in part to its theoretical rigour, and in part to its 
empirical success since, although we do not have empirical evidence that supports the 
hypothesis of full rationality, its key theoretical predictions have generally been confirmed 
empirically 
 
This dissertation proceeds as follows. In part II, we report the rational addiction model 
proposed by Becker and Murphy along with its implications. In part III we summarize and 
discuss some of the main objection to the model on the theoretical ground. In part IV we 
report a number of empirical studies aimed to test the model on panel data. In part V we deal 
with time-inconsistent preferences and their problematic implication with the rational 
addiction model. In part VI we report the data of the European School Survey Project on 
Alcohol and other Drugs (ESPAD) along with some patterns we found. 
 
II.The rational addiction framework 
Before examining the model, it is important to understand that the present notion of addiction 
does not have any negative connotation and includes harmful activities as well as beneficial 
ones. This notion of addiction is therefore extremely wide and ranges from the consumption 
of alcohol, cigarettes, cocaine, heroin, caffeine, to activities such as work, food, TV, sex, 
shopping, religion, jogging, standards of living, that can actually display the same 
characteristics. 
 
Habits and Addictions 
The usual assumption in most discussions on behaviours over time is that current choices do 
not directly depend on choices made in the past. Such an assumption, although it usually 
simplifies many problems that are not crucially affected by dependencies over time, cannot 
hold in dealing with the present issue. The reason is that habits are defined precisely as  
behaviours that display a positive relationship between past and current consumption. This 
means that in habitual behaviours past and present consumption are complementary goods, 
which implies a negative cross elasticity of demand.  
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Habits are regarded as beneficial when greater current consumption raises future utility  (as 
for swimming or jogging) and as harmful when greater present consumption lowers future 
utility (as for heavy drinking, smoking, and overeating). 
An addiction is defined as a strong habit that displays adjacent complementarity.  
We say we have adjacent complementarity when the current consumption of a good c 
increases the marginal utility of its future consumption. Adjacent complementarity is indeed a 
necessary condition for addiction, but it is by no means a sufficient condition even for 
potential addiction. Other parameters must be taken into account, such as the discount rate on 
future utility and the rate of decay or depreciation in the contribution of past consumption to 
present consumption. 
It is interesting to notice that a habit might be raised into an addiction by the exposure to the 
habit itself. This is likely to happen with such habits as alcohol consumption, which are 
amenable either to reduce the negative value that an individual attaches to the future 
consequences of overconsumption, either to increase his discount rate on the future. 
In addition, it should not be overlooked that people often become addicted simply because 
some events turn out differently from what they had expected, affecting the value that they 
attach to their future utility in general. 
It is also true that for harmful addictions the absence of any immediate negative effect from 
past consumption (or the rather quick decay of them) can easily incentive current 
consumption. As an example, an excessive consumption of alcohol is very likely to lead to 
physical and mental effects that any drinker will difficultly forget; on the other hand, 
excessive consumption of cigarettes usually does not bring any particular immediate negative 
effect on a smoker that might induce him to reduce is cigarette consumption. 
We can quite safely state that, other things equals, people who discount the future heavily are 
less likely to be deterred from harmful addictions that reduce their future utility and that they 
would also be less attracted by beneficial addictions that raise it. Of course, the opposite is 
true for people with low discount rates on the future.  
It is no surprise then, that harmful addictions are not seldom associated with other dangerous 
activities. The explanation is very straightforward: people who fall into harmful addictions 
usually have higher discount rates on the future, so they are more likely to indulge also in 
other dangerous behaviours. 
Poor and young people show to be more present-oriented, whereas highly educated people 
usually have lower rates of preference for the present, which is perfectly consistent with their 
choice to study and wait for the delayed benefits of higher education.  
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Although it would be reasonable to expect old people to be more impatient since – to be 
brutal - they do not have much time ahead of them, all data show that the elderly seem to give 
more important to the future than any other age group. However, such a result should be 
treated with caution since it could simply be that people who manage to get old are precisely 
those who are less present-oriented.  
 
What it is important to understand anyway, is that addictions are not an universal endogenous 
property of certain substances or activities, nor a idiosyncratic, or worse, a genetic feature of 
some people: all addictions do necessarily involve an interaction between the individual and 
the good. As a result, the same good is not addictive to everyone indistinctively and the same 
person may be addicted to some goods but not to others.  
 
All the studies on addictions have usually found two important features: reinforcement and 
tolerance.  
Reinforcement implies that greater past consumption of an addictive good increases the desire 
for present consumption. Tolerance, on the other hand, cautions that the greater consumption 
has been in the past, the lower the utility from a given amount of consumption is in the 
present. This does not only imply that current consumption is encouraged by greater past 
consumption, but also that a larger level of current consumption is needed to reach the 
standard of utility set by past consumption. We call these kind of comparisons between past 
and present invidious comparisons and they actually are something everyone is exposed to in 
his daily experience: it is very easy to observe that it is not poor health itself that makes 
elderly people depressed but the decline in health, or that nouveu riches tend to be happier 
than the long-term riches and, conversely, the new poors are more miserable than the long-
term poors.  
So essentially, if utility depends on comparisons between present and past consumption, it 
would be highest just after consumption rose to a permanently higher level, and it would then 
decline over time as the person became accustomed to that level. 
 
Becker and Murphy’s Rational Addiction Model (1988) 
The Becker and Murphy model implies the formulation of a new type of utility function that 
includes the effect of past consumption on current consumption. 
Assuming that the utility of an individual depends on the consumption of two goods, c and y; 
being c the addictive good, the utility function we have is: 
u(t) = u[y(t), c(t), S(t)] 
	   8	  
We assume u to be a strictly concave function of y, c and S. 
S indicates the way past consumption of c affects current utility in a process of learning by 
doing, and it is called consumption capital.  
The rate of change of the stock of consumption capital over time can be written as: 
S = c(t) – δS(t) – h[D(t)] 
Where δ is the instantaneous depreciation rate that measures the exogenous rate of 
disappearance of the physical and mental effects of past consumption of c , and D(t) 
represents the expenditures on endogenous depreciation or appreciation. 
 
Tolerance can be written as us= 𝜕u/  𝜕S < 0, which shows how greater past consumption 
lowers current utility, or differently stated, how higher c(t) lowers future utility. 
Reinforcement can be written as dc/dS > 0 and requires that an increase in past use raises the 
marginal utility of current consumption: ucs= 𝜕2u/  ∂c∂S > 0. 
 
Becker and Murphy then show that rational addictions require that the positive effect (ucs) of 
an increase in S(t) on the marginal utility of c(t) exceeds the negative effect (uss) of higher S(t) 
on the future harm from greater c(t). It is not surprising then that the addiction is more likely 
for people who discount future more heavily and when the effects of past consumption 
depreciate more rapidly.    
 
With a length of life equal to T and a constant rate of time preference σ, the utility function 
would be 
U(0) = 𝑒!! !!! 𝑢[𝑦 𝑡 , 𝑐 𝑡 , 𝑆 𝑡 ] dt 
A rational individual maximizes his utility subject to a constraint on his expenditures that is 
given by the initial value of his assets (A0) and his earnings (w). The optimal solution gives 
the maximum obtainable utility given the initial assets, the initial stock of consumption 
capital, the earnings and the prices. 
The full price or shadow price of an addictive good (Πc(t)) of c(t) equals the sum of its market 
price and the monetary value of the future costs and benefits of consumption. For example, in 
the case of heroin future health damages and the risk of conviction for possession of illegal 
substances should be included among the costs, while in the case of jogging better health in 
the future and the possibility of socializing with new people should be included among the 
benefits. 
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The Effect of Price on the Consumption of Addictive Goods 
According to conventional wisdom the consumption of addictive substances (such as heroin 
or cocaine, but also alcohol and nicotine) is not very responsive to price. However, the 
empirical evidence from the 1970s on does not support such a view, which is also 
contradicted by Becker and Murphy theoretical model. 
As shown in the Becker and Murphy model, an important implication of reinforcement is that 
consumptions of an addictive good at different times are complements, therefore a price 
change either in the past or in the future prices should affect current consumption. An increase 
in future prices, for example, would decrease current consumption since individuals in order 
to maximize their utility in the long-term would be willing to lower the future cost of their 
addiction.  
 
An important insight of the analysis of the effects of price changes on addictive goods 
consumption is that the long-run responses exceed short-run responses. The reason is that in 
the short run the stock of consumption capital is fixed, while in the long run it 
increases/decreases in a way that stimulates further growth or decrease in consumption.  
It follows then that temporary changes in prices of addictive goods have smaller effects on 
consumption than permanent changes. The reason is that complementarity between present 
and future consumption is less relevant with temporary price changes since future prices do 
not change. This is indeed an important insight for lawmakers and legislators willing to tackle 
addictions, since it implies that the only way to effectively reduce consumption in the long 
run is to permanently raise the full price of addiction either through taxation (with legal 
substances) either with more effective law enforcement (with illegal ones). Temporary wars 
on drugs or zero tolerance policies will never significantly affect the consumption of any 
drug, since people perfectly anticipate that the commitment is only temporary. 
 
Since the total cost of addictive goods to consumers equals the sum of the good’s price and 
the money value of the future adverse effects (poor health, risk of criminal punishment) it is 
plausible that as price becomes a bigger share of the total cost, long-run changes in demand 
induced by a given percentage change in the money price get larger relative to the long-run 
changes induced by an equal percentage change in future costs.  
It has also been observed then that the money price tends to be relatively more important to 
poorer and younger consumers, partly because they both generally place a smaller value on 
health and other future harmful effects, partly because they also appear to discount the future 
more heavily.  
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In addition, it is important to stress that changes in the addiction cost may not derive only 
from changes in the monetary price of the good, but also from exogenous events that can 
increase or decrease the total cost of it. Ippolito, Murphy, and Sant estimate that eleven years 
after the first Surgeon General’s report on smoking in 1964, per capita consumption of 
cigarettes had been reduced by 34%. Divorce, unemployment, death of a loved one are all 
examples of events that may affect either the value that an individual attaches on his future 
utility, either his discount rate on the future, inducing larger consumption of harmful addictive 
goods. On the other hand, events such as marriage, a new job, the birth of a child have an 
opposite effect on harmful addictions and can induce a larger consumption of beneficial 
addictive goods. 
We can well understand now why people with the same utility function and the same wealth 
who face the same prices may have different degrees of addiction if they go through different 
experiences.  
 
Cold Turkey  
The expression cold turkey (whose ethology is still a matter of discussion) indicates the abrupt 
cessation of an addiction and the resulting unpleasant experience, as opposed to a gradual 
reduction of consumption over time. This behaviour could look totally inconsistent with 
rationality, but actually it is not only consistent with it, but even necessary. 
A rational individual may decide to end his addiction if some events lowers either his demand 
for the addictive good, either the stock of consumption capital. 
Since we know that the higher the degree of complementarity and the degree of addiction, the 
larger the effect of current consumption on future consumption, rational individuals will end 
stronger addiction more rapidly than weaker ones. Cold turkey is then by no means 
inconsistent with rational addiction, on the contrary, Becker and Murphy model actually 
requires strong addictions to terminate precisely with cold turkey.  
The model does not underestimate the considerable level of pain related to cold turkey, it 
simply states that such a short-run loss in utility is more than compensated by a larger long-
run gain. There is no need then to call for explanations such as weak will or limited self-
control to understand why some addictions can only end abruptly: an individual will 
terminate his addiction if and only if  the discounted value of the long-run gain is larger than 
the value of the short-run loss. 
The extended, ultimate meaning of this is that a person will make certain changes in his 
behaviour only when he finds a way to raise the long-run benefits sufficiently above the short-
run costs of adjustment. Under this point of view, the claim of some heavy drinkers or heavy 
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smokers that they want to but cannot end their addiction is not different from the claim of 
disorganized persons that they want to but they cannot become better organized or from the 
claim of single people that they want but are unable to get married. As soon as the value of 
this people’s long-run utility exceeds the cost of adjustment they will not be smokers, 
alcoholic, disorganized or single any longer. 
 
Cyclical Consumption Patterns and Rational Addiction  
As noticed by Becker and Murphy some addictions (such as alcohol and eating) display 
cycles of consumption in which binges alternate with period of lower consumption or 
abstention. As in the case of cold turkey, such a behaviour may seem the prototype of 
irrationality, but it has actually been proved to be totally consistent with the rational choice 
theory by Becker and Murphy, as well as Englebert J. Dockner and Gustav Feichtinger 
(1993). More precisely, Dockner and Feichtinger take what in Becker and Murphy’s work is 
not much more than a small extension of the model and develop it in a much more complete 
analysis of cyclical consumption of addictive goods. 
The main premise to this extension is the assumption that in order to have cyclical 
consumption, an addictive good must accumulate at least two different stocks of consumption 
capital with different depreciation rates. The interaction of these two stocks are the cause of 
the irregular behaviour. In particular, current consumption must be positively related with one 
of the two stocks and negatively related to the other stock, implying that consumption cycles 
require two counterbalancing effects: an addictive one and a satiating one.  
The best example is arguably overeating, in which case the two stocks are called eating 
capital and weight. The addictive forces (eating capital) causes current consumption to 
increase as past consumption accumulates (the ascending part of the cycle), while the satiating 
forces (weight) causes current consumption to decline as habits accumulate (the descending 
part of the cycle). The higher depreciation rate of the addictive stock then generates periods 
with increasing as well as decreasing consumption. 
 
An interesting insight of this model is that it allows us to make a distinction between full 
addicts and partial addicts. We say that someone is fully addicted if both stocks of capital are 
positively related to consumption, in which case, the individual’s behaviour will display a 
monotonic consumption profile. On the other hand, we say that someone is partially addicted 
if one stock is positively related to consumption and the other is negatively related, in which 
case the individual’s behaviour is very likely to result in consumption cycles. 
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III. Theoretical Opposition to rational addiction 
This section tries to expose some of the most common and important theoretical oppositions 
to the rational addiction theory, leaving to the next ones any objection made on the basis of 
empirical tests. Such critiques are not easy to summarize since they are usually found as a part 
of a more vast and extended framework in opposition to the whole body of Becker’s work and 
to the fundamentals of his rational choice approach. Some of them are very easily rejected, 
some need to be discussed and finally some effectively manage to point out some weaknesses 
in the model. 
 
A rather common argument is that if people were really rational, they would succeed in their 
plans more often than it actually happens in real life. This is a very cheap objection which 
denotes a complete misunderstanding of the term rational. Rationality does not imply the 
achievement of one’s aim, it only means that one has no reason to think that he should have 
acted differently, given what he knew and could have known at the time of his decision. In 
addition, a rational believe does not have to be true, it simply needs to be well supported by 
the available information. (For example, if the only available information about the universe 
came from our sight, then it would be rational to believe that the Earth was flat and the Sun 
went around it). 
A second objection is that a self-destructive activity cannot be consistent with rationality and 
that the rational addiction model implies that addicts – since they act rationally and maximise 
their utility – are happy, while in real life they are often depressed and in even in deep 
physical and mental distress. Again, even assuming this last claim to be true, this reasoning 
shows poor comprehension of the model: maximizing utility does not imply to achieve 
happiness, on the contrary, the model suggests that many individuals become addicts 
precisely because they are unhappy. However, they would be even more unhappy if they were 
prevented from consuming addictive goods. 
 
Arguably one of the most active opponent of Becker’s theories, philosopher Jon Elster, 
notable proponent of Analytical Marxism and critic of Neoclassical Economics, in a number 
of works among which it is worth mentioning Ulysses and the sirens (1977) and  More than 
enough (1996), although recognizing the importance of Becker’s works in applying economic 
theory to new issues, points out many theoretical and logical objections to Becker’s model, 
some of which directly related to rational addiction.  
The most convincing part of Elster works is definitely the one that deals with consistency in 
time preferences and stability of tastes, and it is not by chance that such an issue is also the 
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one upon which we can find more empirical studies not consistent with Becker and Murphy’s 
model, as we will see in the next section. 
The best point made by Elster concerns preferences formation and the attempt by Becker to 
explain them within the rational choice model. What Elster strongly rejects is the notion that 
some preferences can be tracked back to a rational choice made by an individual for the very 
purpose of acquiring those preferences. It is actually very hard to think that people may take 
steps to reduce say their rate of time discounting, since wanting to be motivated by long-term 
concerns ipso facto is to be motivated by long-term concerns. 
However, when it comes to rational addictions Elster’s critiques are less effective and often 
show some lack of good faith. Even not mentioning what frankly cannot be regarded as 
nothing but arrogance in remarks as “for those unused to the reasoning of economists, this 
whole discussion may seem entirely superfluous and my conclusions so obviously true that no 
argument are needed”, the philosopher’s points are often misleading and sometimes show a 
very weak comprehension of the mathematical implications of Becker’s model, which are by 
the way never challenged. Coming to what we called lack of good faith, we would like to 
point out that although Elster’s stance is merely theoretical and is not meant to produce any 
empirical evidence on its side or against the rational addiction model, the philosopher often 
claims that the empirical evidence evidently contradicts Becker and Murphy model, which is 
something that, paraphrasing Elster’s own words on Becker’s theories, is “frankly weird”. 
One of Elster’s arguments is that the rational addiction model is inconsistent with the 
behaviour of many addicts who wish to end their addiction, but cannot manage to do it. This 
objection can be easily rejected since such a behaviour simply shows that the desire to end the 
addiction and the future benefits that will follow do not have for the addict a bigger value than 
the cost of adjustment. Moreover, the behaviour indicated by Elster, where the addict finds 
himself torn between two opposed desire (say overeat and good health) has ben well 
explained by Dockner and Feichtinger in their model of cyclical consumption, which implies 
multiple stocks of consumption capital with opposite relations to current consumption. 
Elster also makes a distinction between chemical and behavioural forms of addictions 
(gambling and overeating, for instance) and between those addictions that have the capacity to 
alterate one’s thought, mood and consciousness, and those which do not. This may at first 
sight look as a distinction that is worth making and it probably is, but it is not relevant as far 
as this discussion is concerned. It does not make any difference whether the addictive 
behaviour is driven by a chemical effect or a behavioural one, as long as the results are the 
same: this is indeed one case in which Milton Friedman’s as-if approach does work. Elster 
undoubtedly makes a good point when he says that it is impossible to establish whether an 
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individual indulges in addictive activities because the exposure to the activity itself raises his 
discount rate on the future or because the activity impairs his awareness and judgement (as it 
happens with alcohol, for example), but we frankly do not see how this could work as an 
argument against the rational addiction model. Moreover, if it is true – and it definitely is – 
that Becker cannot tell the difference between the two scenarios, the opposite is true also: 
Elster himself cannot tell the difference either, but this would never be considered a proof of 
anything at all. 
 
Elster of course is not the only philosopher to have questioned the rational addiction model, 
but it seems that none of these new opponents has brought any new and really interesting 
arguments to the table. On the contrary, the main problem with this works (a good example is 
Ole Rogeberg’s “Taking absurd theories seriously: Economics and the case of rational 
addiction theories”) is that they usually display the same overconfidence noticed in Elster, but 
again no formal challenge of the mathematic model nor any scientific or empirical test in 
support of their thesis. The rational addiction model is often misrepresented and misquoted, 
but most important, it seems to us that the criticism is often made only on the basis of what 
looks like an ideological hostility towards neoclassical economics per se, which also bring the 
authors to incautious critics of the use of mathematics in economics, an issue they are not in 
the position to discuss. Again, it is hard to contain one’s amazement when such works claim 
that there is no empirical evidence to take rational addictions seriously. 
 
IV. Empirical evidence of rational addiction 
The rational addiction model has been tested on a wide range of addictive goods, with data set 
from different countries, at both the level of the individual consumer and the level of the 
market. All the tests have generally showed consistency with its predictions. 
If a good is not an addictive no effect of past or future consumption on current consumption 
should be found. If it is an addictive one but individuals behave according to the myopic 
model, past consumption should have some positive influence on current consumption, but 
future consumption and prices should have no effect on current consumption.  
We report here the empirical results for three different kind of addictive good: cigarettes, 
cocaine and alcohol. 
 
 
 
 
	   15	  
The case of cigarettes 
Arguably one of the most wide spread addictions in the world, cigarette smoking is an ideal 
example for testing the rational addictions model since: consumption is legal, restrictions are 
less strict than with alcohol and reliable data are available at large. 
Applying the model to a pooled data set of the states of the U.S. from 1955 to 1985, Becker, 
Grossman, and Murphy found that cigarette smoking is an addictive behaviour that does not 
show any consistency with the myopic model, and although full rationality cannot be assessed 
either, the results generally support the model of rational addiction. According to their results 
therefore, both past and future consumption significantly impact current consumption and 
future prices influence current consumption in a way that is consistent with the Becker and 
Murphy model.  
Further evidence in support of these rational addiction model has been provided by Frank J. 
Chaloupka using micro data set from the National Health and Nutrition Examination Survey. 
Chaloupka finds that the effect of past consumption on current consumption is always 
significant at the one per cent level and the effect of future consumption is significant at least 
the five per cent level in all but some of the general models.  
Becker, Grossman and Murphy also report that a 10% permanent increase in the price of 
cigarettes reduces current consumption by 4% in the short run and by 7,5% in the long run, 
while Chaloupka’s findings show that past prices have a larger effect on present consumption 
than future prices. His estimation of long-run elasticity of demand falls in the range from -
0.36 to -0.27 for the full sample and in the rang from -0.46 to -0.30 for current smokers. 
Similar results also emerge in Keeler, Hu, Manning, and Barnett from data on per capita 
consumption of cigarettes in California from 1980 to 1990. Again, we can clearly find that an 
increase in past consumption raises current consumption and that short-run price elasticity is 
significantly lower than long-run price elasticity. 
 
The estimates for the various education and age groups tend to support Becker and Murphy 
model, as individuals with fewer years of formal education or younger ones actually seem to 
behave more myopically than more educated or older counterparts. In particular, for less 
educated or younger individuals past consumption and consumption capital have significant 
positive effects on current consumption, while future consumption has a statistically 
insignificant impact. On the other hand, for more educated or older individuals both past and 
future consumption have a statistically significant positive effect on current consumption, 
implying a relative low rate of time preference. In addition, less educated individuals show a 
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significant long-run response to changes in price, while more educated ones are found to be 
quite unresponsive to changes in prices.  
All these results are consistent with Becker and Murphy hypothesis since they shows that 
present-oriented individuals will be more affected by the market price of the addictive good 
than future-oriented ones. This is due to the fact that for present-oriented individuals the 
negative future effects on utility play a minor role in the computation of the full price of the 
addictive consumption.  
Where the empirical data does not fully support the model however, is  in the relation Becker 
and Murphy draw between addictive goods and stressful events. The results on the issue are 
mixed: greater divorce rates are associated with higher level of cigarette consumption, 
however, there seem to be no relation between cigarette consumption and unemployment. 
 
The case of cocaine 
Taking part to the debate on drug legalization Grossman, Chaloupka, and Brown apply the 
rational addiction approach to address the question whether legalization of drugs would have 
a positive effect on consumption. Leaving aside the debate on legalization (which is 
extremely interesting but not relevant for the present discussion), we can still use some of 
their findings to look for elements of consistency with the rational addiction model. 
Their estimates show that the effects of both past and future consumption are significantly 
positive on current consumption, while the price effects are significantly negative. This 
clearly indicates that cocaine consumption is an addictive good, but also rules out the 
hypothesis that cocaine consumers are myopic, since current consumption is affected by 
future consumption and price. 
Consistently with the rational addiction model the long-run elasticity of demand is substantial 
and is approximately twice as large as the short-run elasticity (it falls in the range from -1.26 
to -1,56) 
 
The case of alcohol 
The application of the rational addiction model to alcohol is more complicated. The reason is 
that one of the peculiarity of alcohol is that, differently from other addictive goods, its 
consumption is much more continuous than the bimodal distribution that is likely to 
characterize the consumption of other addictive goods such as cigarettes, cocaine and heroin. 
The consequent problem is that aggregate data from all age group are easily dominated by the 
behaviour of moderate and light drinkers. This means that in order to analyse addictive 
	   17	  
behaviour it could be necessary to focus on the age groups that show the highest level of 
alcohol overconsumption. 
Consistently with this premises, Grossman, Chaloupka, and Sirtalan (1995) employ the data 
formed from the nationally representative cross-sectional survey of high school seniors 
conducted each year since 1975 by the Institute for Social Research of the University of 
Michigan. The members of the panel range in age from seventeen through twenty-seven years 
old, which is a particularly good interval since other studies, including the National Health 
Interview Survey (1988) and Grant (1991), report that the prevalence of alcohol dependence 
and abuse is highest precisely among this age group. In particular, alcohol abuse and 
addiction falls from 17% for people aged eighteen through twenty-nine to less than 2% for 
people aged sixty-five and over.  
Their estimates clearly indicate that alcohol consumption is addictive in the sense that 
increases in past or future consumption cause current consumption to rise. Although we have 
general evidence in support of the rational addiction model, and no element in support of the 
myopic consumption hypothesis can be found at all, estimates are not fully consistent with 
Becker and Murphy model since they show discount factors implausibly high. 
Dealing with the effects of price changes on consumption, the long-run price elasticity is 
approximately 60% larger than the short-run price elasticity. A major implication is that any 
forecast of increases in tax revenues through excise tax hikes would be considerably 
overstated and forecasts of reduction in consumption would be considerably understated if 
they did not take into account the long-term price elasticity in the rational addiction 
framework.  
These results have been confirmed also by Waters and Sloan (1995) whose study also shows 
– consistently with Becker and Murphy - that consumption by younger and poorer people 
demonstrates higher sensitivity to all money prices. However, this pattern cannot be found for 
other kind of “prices” such as fines and criminal punishment. One explanation could be that 
the effect predicted by the rational framework could be obscured by other factors: poorer and 
under-age people are more likely to consume alcohol at home, laws are less strictly enforced 
in poorer neighbourhoods, people with lower incomes are less likely to own a car, etc. 
 
V. Time-inconsistent preferences 
Becker and Murphy model imposes two assumptions on the consumer behaviour: the first is 
forward-looking decision making, and the second is that consumers are time consistent.  
Although the first one is very hard to impugn and has become a key assumption in the 
development of alternative models too, the second one, under which the marginal rate of 
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substitution (MRS) between consumption in t+1 and t is constant and equal to the discount 
rate, is clearly contradicted by psychological evidence and experiments which reveal that 
consumers have a lower discount rate when making decisions over time interval further away 
than for ones closer to the present. In other words, under time-inconsistent preferences the 
MRS between consumption at two future dates is not constant and depends on the date at 
which it is evaluated. 
It needs to be stressed however that there is very little non-experimental evidence for time-
inconsistency in decision making, but there is no evidence that supports time-consistent 
preferences either 
 
The most common form of time inconsistency is hyperbolic discounting (Strotz, 1956) where 
MRS decreases with the horizon resulting in a salience effect (Akerlof, 1991) on immediate 
consumption as opposed to delayed consumption. In other words, under hyperbolic 
discounting individuals do not evaluate future utility streams in the same manner at different 
dates. 
A time-inconsistent choice is one that would not have been made if it had been contemplated 
from a removed, dispassionate perspective; it is the result of a transient alteration in tastes 
rather than a re-evaluation of an alternative due to receipt of new information. A possible 
explanation of time inconsistencies has been provide by  Danile Kahneman and Amos 
Tversky and is related to the concepts of reference point and adaptation. The reference point 
reflects the fact that people might be less concerned with absolute attainments than with 
attainments relative to some psychologically relevant comparison point. Adaptation rises 
every time a consumer does not any longer regard the purchase of a good as hypothetical and 
gets used to the idea of its consumption before actually owning it: in this case failing to own 
the product is not neutral any more, but results in deprivation, that is to say disutility. 
 
Gruber and Koszegi argue that Becker and Murphy model and its empirical applications run 
into a number of critical problems.  
First of all, all the tests rely on the assumption that individuals do forecast prices far in 
advance, which is not always the case since very few price increases are announced this far in 
advance. It is conceptually difficult therefore, to conceive individuals who are able to forecast 
well future prices and it can be easily found that excise tax changes are rarely known one year 
in advance.  
Second, the dependent variable in BGM’s regression is cigarettes sales, not consumption: this 
means that if individuals really did anticipate future price changes, then it would be consistent 
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with the rational framework for individuals to stockpile cigarettes while they are less 
expensive. Of course, if the price change is far in the future stockpiling is not likely to occur, 
but as we said before, far future price changes are also difficult to anticipate, so when 
anticipation is most easy is precisely when stockpiling is most likely to happen.  
Third, and perhaps most importantly, BGM test is unable to distinguish true future price 
effects from other long-term effects which are unlikely to remain fixed. For instance, it has 
been shown (Showalter, 2000) that future prices are correlated with current consumption and 
that an oligopolistic tobacco manufacturer facing a relatively inelastic demand for cigarettes 
would react to declining consumption by raising prices.  
Testing the model on cigarette smoking, Gruber and Koszegi suggest an alternative kind of 
test: examining how consumption changes when a tax increase is actually announced, but not 
yet effective. Their analysis, based on the legislative history from 1973 to 1996 and on two 
different sources of data on cigarette consumption (the annual data used by BMG and others 
along with the monthly sales data) shows a strong negative effect of current tax on 
consumption, with a price elasticity of -0.8, which is  significantly higher than that found by 
BMG. In addition, a price increase within a month that is announced but not effective yet has 
a positive effect on cigarettes sales, as consumers hoard cigarettes at lower price for future 
use. This so-called “hoarding effect” is consistent with the rational addiction framework since 
it shows that consumers have a rational ad forward-looking behaviour, but also implies that 
sales will most sharply fall in the long term.  
The important point made by Gruber and Koszegi is that even when we manage to 
demonstrate forward looking behaviour among consumers, this does not necessarily imply 
time consistency. Since smoking is a short-term pleasure and the psychological evidence 
indicates that time inconsistency is most prevalent with short horizons, their test formulation 
should be especially fruitful.  
 
Gruber and Koszagi point out that there are two key features to distinguish time-consistent 
and time-inconsistent agents. The first is the use of commitment devices or self-control 
techniques as opposed to alternative technology for smoking cessation such as quitting aids: 
whereas quitting aids decrease the disutility from not smoking, self-control devices lower the 
utility from smoking. Time-consistent decision makers would rather use a quitting aid than a 
self-control device since lowering the utility of an undesired alternative would be irrelevant. 
On the other hand, for time-inconsistent agents, self control devices are valued as a way to 
struggle one’s own time-inconsistent tendencies. A rather common example are social 
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incentives such as betting with friends and inform them about the decision or developing 
various form of self punishment.  
The second feature that distinguishes time-consistent agents from time-inconsistent ones is an 
inability to actualize predicted or desired future levels of smoking. We can actually find two 
kind of time-inconsistent agents: naive agents and sophisticated agents. Naive agents are 
impatient in the sense that they attach extra value to the present relative to the future, but they 
are unaware of they future self-control problems, in other words: naive agents maximize their 
intertemporal utility unconscious of the fact that their future selves will change their plans. 
Sophisticated agents on the other hand, are aware of their self-control problem: self t knows 
that self t+1 is going to be willing to do something other than what self t would have him to 
do, therefore the best thing self t can do is to make a plan he knows self t+1 will follow. The 
approach that has just been exposed is often called multi-selves game theory since each 
individual is regarded as the collection of different selves that are incarnation of the same 
individual at different dates. 
An attempt to restore the unity of the individual as a single self has been made by Caillaud, 
Cohen, and Jullien (1999) who argue that individuals often follow rules and principles that 
result in “plans of action”. This approach does internalise logical inconsistencies such as the 
re-initializing of the plan by the individual. In facts, if the individual is a sophisticated agent 
he will structure his plan in a way that at any time it will be more expensive to quit and re-
initialise the plan rather than continuing it. 
 
VI.The European School survey Project on Alcohol and other Drugs (ESPAD) 
The use of addictive substances among young people is of great concern in most countries 
and many studies have been undertaken in order to improve the understanding of 
consumption patterns. The main purpose of ESPAD is precisely to collect comparable data on 
substance use among 15-16 years old Europeans students in order to monitor trends within 
and between countries. The 2007 ESPAD is based on 35 national surveys united by a 
common project plan and standardized methodological guidelines.  
We report here some of the results of the 2007 survey for different substances and goods. 
 
Cigarettes 
The legal minimum age for smoking is 18 years old in all countries except Austria, Belgium 
and some Swiss canton where the minimum age is 16. What it is important to remember 
however, is that in most countries (with the exclusion of Austria, Estonia, Finland, Germany, 
Hungary, Ireland, Lithuania, Portugal and some part of Switzerland) the minimum age is not 
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for cigarette smoking, but for cigarette purchasing, meaning that it’s not smoking itself to be 
illegal, but the purchase of cigarettes. 
 
Tab . 1 Data on cigarette consumption 
 Average Males Females 
Perceived Availability 
Students replying that cigarettes are very 
easy or fairly easy to obtain 
 
72% 
 
74% 
 
71% 
Lifetime Consumption 
Students replying that they have smoked at 
least once during their lifetime 
 
 59% 
 
59% 
 
58% 
Recent Consumption 
Students replying that they have smoked at 
least once during the last 30 days 
 
29% 
 
28% 
 
29% 
 
As we see from the data, almost three quarters of the students replied that they found very 
easy or fairly easy to get hold of cigarettes if they want, and almost 60% claims to have 
smoked at least once.  
As we can see from Fig. 1, no clear geographical pattern can be found, although it can be 
quite safely stated that students reporting higher rates of smoking are likely to live in central 
and eastern European countries rather than in the Mediterranean ones, with the exception of 
Spain. Particularly low figures are reported in Armenia, the only country where more than 
half of the students does not perceive as “very easy” or “fairly easy” to obtain cigarettes and 
where less than one out of four students has ever tried smoking. 
At the aggregate level the gender differences are not very significant, however this is not 
always the case for individual countries as we can see in Fig.2, where we report the case of 14 
countries in which we observe a gender difference of more than five percentage points in 
recent consumption. No clear geographical pattern can be found for gender differences either, 
but we can observe that in the countries where recent smoking is above average the most-
frequent smoking are girls (with the exception of Latvia, Lithuania, Russia and Ukraine). 
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Fig. 1 Perceived Availability (1), Lifetime use (2) and 30 days use 3) by country 
 
 
Fig. 2 Gender difference in recent cigarette consumption in selected countries 
 
             
Tab. 2 Correlations 
 
According to Tab.2 there is a very strong statistical correlation between lifetime use of 
cigarettes and recent consumption (r = 0,90), as we can also see in Fig.4. Still significant, but 
lower is correlation between lifetime use of cigarette and perceived availability of it (r = 0,64) 
in Fig.3, and even lower the correlation between the latter and recent consumption (r = 0,55). 
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 Fig. 3 Correlation between perceived availability and lifetime use 
 
 
Fig 4. Correlation between lifetime use and recent use (30 days) 
 
We also looked for correlations between the consumption of cigarettes by minors and the 
level of education of their parents (Tab.3) and the results in Tab.4 clearly show that a higher 
level of parents’ education has a negative effect on cigarette consumption.  
 
Tab.3 Parents level of education 
Degree Father (esp37) Mother (esp38) 
1. Completed primary school or less  9.05% 8.04% 
2. Some secondary school 13.02% 11.62% 
3. Completed secondary school 26.43% 28.58% 
4. Some college or university 9.44% 10.81% 
5. Completed college or university 26.25% 29.02% 
6. Do not know 13.96% 10.82% 
7. Does not apply 1.85% 1.11% 
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Tab.4 The assosiaction between cigarette consumption in the last 30 days and father 
education (esp37), mother education (esp38) 
	   	   Coeff.	   Std.	  Err.	   z	   P>|z|	   [95%	  Conf.	  Int]	  
esp37	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
	   1	   .003953	   .0171893	   0.23	   0.818	   -­‐.0297375	   .0376435	  
	   2	   -­‐.0512287	   .0153729	   -­‐3.33	   0.001	   -­‐.0813591	   -­‐.0210983	  
	   3	   -­‐.0552794	   .0186295	   -­‐2.97	   0.003	   -­‐.0917925	   -­‐.0187663	  
	   4	   -­‐.1793315	   .015545	   -­‐11.54	   0.000	   -­‐.2097991	   -­‐.1488639	  
	   5	   -­‐.0010726	   .0169941	   -­‐0.06	   0.950	   -­‐.0343805	   .0322352	  
	   6	   -­‐.0767122	   .0328151	   -­‐2.34	   0.019	   -­‐.1410286	   -­‐.0123957	  
	  
esp38	   1	   .0471234	   .0182671	   2.58	   0.010	   .0113207	   .0829262	  
	   2	   -­‐.0096589	   .0159961	   -­‐0.60	   0.546	   -­‐.0410106	   .0216929	  
	   3	   -­‐.0225491	   .0186832	   -­‐1.21	   0.227	   -­‐.0591675	   .0140694	  
	   4	   -­‐.1164043	   .0160817	   -­‐7.24	   0.000	   -­‐.1479238	   -­‐.0848847	  
	   5	   .0105915	   .0186521	   0.57	   0.570	   -­‐.025966	   .047149	  
	   6	   -­‐.0392078	   .0412779	   -­‐0.95	   0.342	   -­‐.120111	   .0416955	  
 
We wanted to test then if a similar kind of relationship could be observed also for higher 
levels of economic wealth (Tab.5) and the results in Tab.6 unsurprisingly show that a level of 
wealth that is under the average has a positive effect on the cigarette consumption. Un other 
words, higher levels of economic wealth have a negative impact on cigarette consumption. 
 
Tab.5 Family economic wealth 
Degree Father (esp39) 
very much better off 5.46 
much better off 10.06 
better off 23.99 
about the same 52.37 
less well off 6.50 
much less well off 1.12 
very much less well off 0.50 
 
Tab.6 The assosiaction between cigarette consumption in the last 30 days and family 
wealth (esp39) 
	   	   Coeff.	   Std.	  Err.	   z	   P>|z|	   [95%	  Conf.	  Int]	  
esp39	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
	   2	   -­‐.0758192	   .0207474	   -­‐3.65	   0.000	   -­‐.1164833	   -­‐.035155	  
	   3	   -­‐.110374	   .0184929	   -­‐5.97	   0.000	   -­‐.1466194	   -­‐.0741286	  
	   4	   -­‐.089969	   .017498	   -­‐5.14	   0.000	   -­‐.1242645	   -­‐.0556735	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   5	   .0536397	   .0223067	   2.40	   0.016	   .0099194	   .09736	  
	   6	   .1511021	   .03892	   3.88	   0.000	   .0748202	   .2273839	  
	   7	   .352829	   .0536986	   6.57	   0.000	   .2475817	   .4580762	  
 
 
Alcohol 
The minimum age for drinking is 18 years old in most European countries with the following 
exceptions:  
• Austria: 16  
• Belgium, Denmark, Germany and Switzerland: 16 for beer and wine, 18 for spirits 
• Malta and Cyprus: 17 
• Finland, Norway, Sweden: 18 for ABV < 22%, 20 for ABV > 22% 
• Iceland: 20 
Again, as for cigarettes, in most of the countries the minimum age deals with the purchase of 
alcohol and not with the consumption of alcohol, with the exception of Austria, Cyprus, 
Estonia, Finland, Hungary, Ireland, Lithuania, Malta and Ukraine, where it is not just illegal 
to purchase alcohol under the minimum age, but also to drink it. 
 
Tab.7 Data on alcohol consumption 
 Average Males Females 
1.Perceived Availability 
Students replying that alcoholic substances are very 
easy or fairly easy to obtain 
 
68% 
 
69% 
 
67% 
2.Lifetime Consumption 
Students replying that they have tried alcohol least 
once during their lifetime 
 
89% 
 
90% 
 
89% 
3.Recent Consumption 
- Students replying that they have used alcohol at 
least once during the last 12 months 
- Students replying that they have used alcohol at 
least once during the last 30 days 
 
82% 
 
61% 
 
 
82% 
 
63% 
 
82% 
 
60% 
 
A very interesting observation from Tab.7 is that the percentage of students who find “very 
easy” or “fairly easy” to obtain alcoholic beverages (68%) is substantially smaller than the 
percentage that claims to have used alcohol at least once (89%). The explanation of this figure 
has several parts. First of all, alcoholic substances are seen by minors as a kind of taboo or 
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transgression, meaning that minors will actually take chances for consuming alcohol even 
when it is perceived as rather difficult to obtain. Secondly, in many countries the presence of 
a minimum age does not imply an effective enforcement of it: alcohol purchasing or 
consumption under age, even when illegal, might be tolerated or very rarely sanctioned. 
Finally, even with strict enforcement of the minimum age laws at the selling point (grocery 
stores, bars, pubs, restaurants, …) minors can still have access to alcohol in contexts where it 
has been purchased by older people, not last their own families. 
Again, it is hard to establish any geographical pattern, but as with cigarettes it is safe stating 
that central and eastern European countries are more likely to show figures above the average. 
 
Fig. 5 Perceived Availability (1), Lifetime consumption (2), 12 months consumption (3), 
30 days consumption (4) 
 
Although less significant than for smoking, gender differences do again become larger as the 
consumption frequency increases, but in this case the most frequent drinking are boys. There 
are however countries where girls are more frequent drinkers than boys: Iceland (+7%), 
Norway (+7%), Sweden (+6%), Estonia (+4%), Finland (+3%), UK (+2%). 
The geographic pattern is pretty clear here: girls in Nordic countries tend to drink more than 
boys. 
 
Fig. 6 Gender differences recent alcohol consumption in selected countries 
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    Tab. 8 Correlations 
 
 
As we can se in Tab.8 correlations between lifetime use and recent use of alcohol are even 
stronger than the correlations observed for cigarettes and this is also reflected by following 
graph. 
 
Fig. 7 Correlation between lifetime use and last 12 months use 
 
The estimation of the average amount of pure alcohol consumed by students on the last 
alcohol-drinking day is done by simply adding the alcoholic component of each drink the 
student had on the last day he or she drunk alcohol. The underlying idea is to spot not just the 
frequency of drinking, but also its intensity to see if there are discrepancies between the two.  
 
Tab. 9 
Estimated Average Consumption 
cl of pure alcohol assumed during the last 
drinking day 
Average Males Females 
4,2 cl 4,8 cl 3,5 cl 
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Fig. 9 Estimated average consumption of pure alcohol during the latest alcohol-drinking 
day (cl) 
 
 
On the aggregate country level there is no statistical association between countries with 
higher frequency in consumption and countries where higher amounts of alcohol were 
consumed on the last drinking day. The correlation between alcohol use in the last 30 days 
and the amount consumed in the last alcohol-drinking day is very weak: r = 0,27. This figure 
has a very interesting interpretation: in many countries drinking is less frequent precisely 
because the amounts usually consumed are smaller and vice versa. This is no strange 
phenomenon: in southern countries (Greece for instance) drinking can be very diffuse, but in 
moderate and regular quantities, on the other hand, in many Nordic countries drinking is 
somehow restrained in some periods (usually during the week) and then tolerated even in 
excessive amounts in other periods (usually on the weekends).  
 
Fig. 10 Correlation between recent consumption and amount of alcohol consumed on the 
last drinking day 
 
 
Here are some examples: countries above average for frequencies such as Czech Rep. 
(+14%), Malta (+12%), Greece (+11%), are on average (Czech Rep.) or even significantly 
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below average (Malta and Greece) for quantity. Conversely, countries that are way under the 
average for frequency, such as Norway (-19%), Finland (-14%) and Sweden (-13%) are all 
above average for quantities. It is probably by no chance that Norway, Finland and Sweden 
are also the countries with the strictest regulation on minimum age and it would be 
interesting to test whether these figures are the cause of such stricter regulation or represent 
a failure of it. Of course we have some exceptions too: Austria, Denmark, Germany, 
Netherlands and UK are all well above the average for both frequency and quantities. 
 
Although in general we can say that larger amounts are consumed by boys, we can also 
observe some interesting pattern in gender differences across the ESPAD countries: 
differences are larger in countries that have a general score below the average and smaller in 
countries that have a general score above the average. A geographical pattern here is quite 
clear again: girls tend to drink as much and sometimes even more than boys in Nordic 
countries like Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden. 
 
Students were also ask to answer how many times they have been intoxicated by alcohol in 
their lifetime, in the last 12 months and in the last 30 days (Tab.10). On average, half of the 
students in the ESAPD countries reported having been drunk at least once during their 
lifetime, but the differences between countries are quite significant, as we can see in Fig. 11. 
 
Tab. 10  Alcohol abuse and intoxication 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Alcohol Abuse and intoxication Average Males Females 
- Students replying that they have been drunk 
at least once during their lifetime 
- Students replying that they have been drunk 
at least once during the last 12 months 
- Students replying that they have been drunk 
at least once during the last 30 days 
50% 
 
39% 
 
18% 
 
51% 
 
40% 
 
19% 
 
48% 
 
38% 
 
17% 
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Fig.11  
 
 
In the majority of countries boys report intoxication experience more often than girls. 
However, what it is interesting to observe is that, again, when we look at the gender 
differences they are usually larger in countries where intoxication experiences are below the 
total average and smaller in those countries that score above the average. Actually all the 
countries where girls reported intoxication more often than boys are all above the general 
average: Finland, Ireland, Isle of Man, Norway, Monaco, Spain, Sweden and UK. Conversely, 
all the countries that show large differences between girls and boys are below the average. 
 
Fig.12 Gender differences for alcohol intoxication in the last 30 days in some countries 
 
 
In Tab.11 we can find the correlation coefficients for alcohol intoxication. It is quite evident 
that higher level of intoxication in the last 12 months are likely to be found in countries where 
students have been intoxicated at least once during their lifetime (r = 0,94). It is no surprise 
then, that the level of intoxication in the last 30 days is highly correlated with the level of 
intoxication in the last 12 months ( r = 0,93). We can see these correlations in Fig. 12 and 13. 
0	  10	  20	  
30	  40	  50	  
60	  70	  80	  
90	  100	  
De
nm
ar
k	  
Is
le
	  o
f	  M
an
	  
Au
st
ria
	  
U
k	  
La
tv
ia
	  
Cz
ec
h	  
Re
p	  
Ge
rm
an
y	  
Sl
ov
ak
	  R
ep
	  
Li
th
ua
ni
a	  
Ru
ss
ia
	  
Fr
an
ce
	  
Cr
oa
=a
	  
Es
to
ni
a	  
Sp
ai
n	  
Sl
ov
en
ia
	  
Hu
ng
ar
y	  
Ire
la
nd
	  
Bu
lg
ar
ia
	  
Fi
nl
an
d	  
U
kr
ai
ne
	  
Fa
ro
e	  
Is
la
nd
s	  
Sw
itz
er
la
nd
	  
M
on
ac
o	  
N
or
w
ay
	  
M
al
ta
	  
N
et
he
rla
nd
s	  
Po
la
nd
	  
Be
lg
iu
m
	  
Ita
ly
	  
Gr
ee
ce
	  
Po
rt
ug
al
	  
Cy
pr
us
	  
Ar
m
en
ia
	  
Inotxocation	  lifetime	  Intoxication	  12	  months	  Intoxication	  30	  days	  
0	  10	  
20	  30	  
40	  50	  
Isle	  of	  
Man	  
UK	   Ireland	   Finland	   Norway	  Romania	  Belgium	   Cyprus	   Armenia	  
Males	  
	   31	  
Tab. 11 Correlations 
 
The questionnaire also asked to the students how many times in the last 30 days they had had 
at least five drinks on the same occasion. The idea behind this question is to measure alcohol 
abuse in a more standardized and less subjective way, since consuming five of more drinking 
would certainly cause most students of this age to reach some level of intoxication, while the 
concept of “being drunk” might be subjective. A summary of the data is presented in Tab.12 
and Fig.15. 
 
Tab. 12 Episodic heavy drinking 
 Average Males Females 
- Students replying that they have had at least 5 
drinks on one occasion during the last 30 days 
43% 
 
47% 
 
39% 
 
 
Fig.15 Students replying that they have had at least 5 drinks on one occasion during the 
last 30 days 
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Heavy drinking in the last 30 days is in general more common among boys than among girls, 
although we have some exceptions: Iceland, Norway, Sweden and Uk. This is a geographic 
pattern we have already found for alcohol drinking and confirms the above the average use of 
alcohol by girls in Nordic countries. 
The first thing we notice is that the average of the students who claim to have had five or 
more drinks in the last 30 days (43%) is considerably higher than the percentage of those who 
claimed of having been drunk in the last 30 days (18%). The correlation between the two 
statistics is showed is actually lower then expected (r = 0,47) and is not significant at the 0.01 
level. This fact is quite problematic and has to deal with two fundamental problems: first the 
number of students who got intoxicated is easily underestimated for the social stigma that 
might attached to drunkenness at such a young age, secondly, the definition of “drink” is not 
very precise and may vary from country to country. 
 
Fig.16 Correlation between heavy drinking in the last 30 days and intoxication in the 
last 30 days 
 
 
One of the aims of the Espad questionnaire is also to point out what are the differences in the 
students’ perception of alcohol consumption. Such differences do not vary only between 
people, but also between countries due to the different cultural and social attitude towards 
alcohol and its consumption. Different cultures do not only promote different use of alcohol, 
but also attach different judgment to its use and abuse, which has a very strong psychological 
effect on alcohol users. According to the rational addictions framework, when choosing 
whether to consume an addictive good each individual takes into consideration the discounted 
value of the benefits and the costs of its use and takes his decisions accordingly. Therefore, it 
would be interesting to look for patterns between countries with high rate of alcohol 
consumption and countries where alcohol drinking has a positive perception or is expected to 
have positive effects, and vice versa. Of course this is very far from proving anything in favor 
0	  10	  
20	  30	  
40	  50	  
60	  70	  
0	   10	   20	   30	   40	   50	   60	  
	   33	  
or against the rational addiction framework, and honestly not even in favor or against forward 
looking behavior, but it could still be an interesting pattern to observe. In Tab.13 we 
summarize some of the results of ESPAD questionnaire on alcohol expected effects. Although 
the data for all countries are not available, we can observe that with the only exception of 
Ukraine, all the countries that report expected positive effects score above the average for all 
the alcohol drinking statistics. On the other hand, we can observe that many (but not all) of 
the countries where negative effects outweigh positive ones show below-the average data for 
the alcohol drinking statistics. 
 
Tab. 13 Expected Negative and Positive consequences of alcohol consumption 
Very Positive 
Effects 
Positive Effects Neutral Negative Effects Very Negative 
Effects 
UK 
Isle of Man 
Czech Republic 
Ukraine 
Austria 
Belgium 
Denmark 
Estonia 
Germany 
Hungary 
Ireland 
Malta 
Netherlands 
Norway 
Sweden  
Russia 
Armenia 
Bulgaria 
Slovak Republic 
Croatia 
Cyprus 
Greece 
Latvia 
Portugal 
Slovenia 
Switzerland 
Italy 
Lithuania 
Poland 
Romania 
 
The correlation between positive anticipated effects and alcohol consumption in the last 30 
days is not particularly high (r = 0,20) as we can see from Fig.16. However it definitely is 
higher when we look at the correlation with intoxication in the last 30 days (r = 0,50) as we 
can see from Fig.17. 
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Fig.16 Correlation between alcohol effects perception and its consumption in the last 30 
days 
 
 
Fig.17 Correlation between alcohol effects perception and intoxication in the last 12 
months and the last 30 days 
 
 
Fig. 18 Correlation between alcohol effects perception and estimated average 
consumption 
 
0	  10	  
20	  30	  
40	  50	  
60	  70	  
80	  90	  
-­‐6	   -­‐4	   -­‐2	   0	   2	   4	   6	  
0	  10	  
20	  30	  
40	  50	  
60	  70	  
80	  
-­‐6	   -­‐4	   -­‐2	   0	   2	   4	   6	   0	  
10	  20	  
30	  40	  
50	  60	  
-­‐6	   -­‐4	   -­‐2	   0	   2	   4	   6	  
0	  1	  
2	  3	  
4	  5	  
6	  7	  
8	  
-­‐6	   -­‐4	   -­‐2	   0	   2	   4	   6	  
	   35	  
 
As with cigarettes, we wanted to test for correlations between the overconsumption of alcohol 
and the education of the parents. In order to have a quite objective indicator of 
“overconsumption” we use the data about “having drinking 5 of more dinks on the last 
drinking occasion and we regressed it on the parents’ level of education as previously 
reported and the results in Tab.14 again show that higher level of education in the family 
background have a negative impact on the overconsumption of alcohol.  
 
Tab.14 The assosiaction between alcohol overconsumption in the last 30 days and father 
education    (esp37), mother education (esp38) 
 
	   	   Coeff.	   Std.	  Err.	   z	   P>|z|	   [95%	  Conf.	  Int]	  
esp37	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
	   2	   .0910825	   .0195218	   4.67	   0.000	   .0528205	   .1293446	  
	   3	   -­‐.0115062	   .0179045	   -­‐0.64	   0.520	   -­‐.0465984	   .023586	  
	   4	   -­‐.0410317	   .0209318	   -­‐1.96	   0.050	   -­‐.0820572	   -­‐6.14e-­‐06	  
	   5	   -­‐.1206412	   .0180748	   -­‐6.67	   0.000	   -­‐.1560671	   -­‐.0852153	  
	   6	   -­‐.0552037	   .0195294	   -­‐2.83	   0.005	   -­‐.0934805	   -­‐.0169269	  
	   7	   -­‐.0062697	   .0344546	   -­‐0.18	   0.856	   -­‐.0737996	   .0612602	  
	  
esp38	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
	   2	   .1469302	   .020965	   7.01	   0.000	   .1058396	   .1880208	  
	   3	   .0424422	   .0189397	   2.24	   0.025	   .0053209	   .0795634	  
	   4	   .0118949	   .0213697	   0.56	   0.578	   -­‐.029989	   .0537788	  
	   5	   -­‐.055456	   .0190033	   -­‐2.92	   0.004	   -­‐.0927018	   -­‐.0182103	  
	   6	   .0033186	   .0214108	   0.15	   0.877	   -­‐.0386458	   .0452831	  
	   7	   .0353539	   .0424773	   0.83	   0.405	   -­‐.0479002	   .1186079	  
 
It is no surprise then that that we can spot the same effect also for higher level of wealth as 
reported in Tab.15. What we can notice however is that only level of wealth that are indicated 
as “very much less well off” have actually a positive effect on alcohol overconsumption. 
 
Tab. 15 Association between alcohol overconsumption in the last 30 days and family 
wealth (esp39) 
	   	   Coeff.	   Std.	  Err.	   z	   P>|z|	   [95%	  Conf.	  Int]	  
esp39	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
	   2	   -­‐.0820098	   .0211196	   -­‐3.88	   0.000	   -­‐.1234034	   -­‐.0406162	  
	   3	   -­‐.1246423	   .0188157	   -­‐6.62	   0.000	   -­‐.1615205	   -­‐.0877642	  
	   4	   -­‐.1606131	   .0177519	   -­‐9.05	   0.000	   -­‐.1954062	   -­‐.12582	  
	   5	   -­‐.0813387	   .022713	   -­‐3.58	   0.000	   -­‐.1258554	   -­‐.0368221	  
	   6	   -­‐.0564076	   .0398652	   -­‐1.41	   0.157	   -­‐.134542	   .0217268	  
	   36	  
	   7	   .1489577	   .0554414	   2.69	   0.007	   .0402946	   .2576209	  
 
 
Illicit drugs 
The concept of “illicit drugs” includes marijuana, hashish, amphetamines, cocaine, heroin, 
crack, ecstasy and LSD or other hallucinogens. 
 
Tab.16 
 Average Males Females 
Lifetime use of any illicit drug 20% 23% 17% 
 
As we can see in Fig.19, lifetime use varies dramatically between countries, but no 
geographical pattern can be found. In general, boys report higher percentages for lifetime use: 
the largest differences between gender are reported in Fig.20. As we can see, the only striking 
exception of Monaco, where girls report values considerably above boys. 
 
Fig.19 Lifetime use of any illicit drug 
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Fig.20 Gender differences in lifetime consumption of any illicit drug 
 
 
Cannabis 
As we can see in Tab.17 the vast majority of students who have tried any illicit drug have 
used cannabis: we can actually see that the figure for lifetime use of cannabis is only one 
percentage point below the figure for lifetime use of any drug. This is true not only at the 
aggregate level, but also if we pick each country separately, with the only exceptions of 
Austria an Latvia, where lifetime use of cannabis scores five percentage points below the 
average.  
The statistical correlation between these two variables is almost perfect: r = 0,99, meaning 
that countries that score high in any illicit drug lifetime use are very likely to score high in 
cannabis lifetime use too and vice versa.  
It is no surprise then that the gender differences are essentially the same reported for any 
illicit drug. 
 
Tab.17 
 Average Males Females 
Perceived Availability 
Students replying that marijuana is very easy or 
fairly easy to obtain 
 
33% 
 
35% 
 
31% 
Lifetime Consumption 
Students replying that they have tried 
marijuana once during their lifetime 
 
19% 
 
22% 
 
16% 
Recent Consumption 
- Students replying that they have used 
 
14% 
 
16% 
 
12% 
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marijuana at least once during the last 12 
months 
- Students replying that they have used 
marijuana at least once during the last 30 
days 
 
 
7% 
 
 
9% 
 
 
6% 
 
Fig.21 Use of Cannabis country by country 
 
As we can see in Fig. 22 the correlation between lifetime use and last 12 months use is almost 
perfect with r = 0,99, while for the correlation between last 12 months use and last 30 days 
use we have r = 0,96. 
 
Fig. 22  
 
A quite striking observation we made about cannabis consumption is that, differently from 
alcohol and cigarettes, higher levels of education in the family background do not have any 
negative impact on consumption (Tab.18). This does not mean that the coefficients of lower 
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levels of education are not higher, as they actually are, but shows that more education in the 
family background does not have any negative impact on consumption. 
The same fact can be said about the family economic wealth (Tab.19), as levels above the 
average do not have a significant negative effect on consumption. Again, it must be stressed 
that we are not saying that levels of wealth under the average do not have larger coefficients, 
what we are saying is that although coefficients for higher levels are smaller they are still 
positive, so no negative impact of economic wealth on cannabis consumption can be found. 
 
Tab. 18 Assocaition between cannabis consumption in the last 30 days and father 
education (esp37), mother education (esp38) 
	   	   Coeff.	   Std.	  Err.	   z	   P>|z|	   [95%	  Conf.	  Int]	  
esp37	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
	   2	   .1429389	   .0214923	   6.65	   0.000	   .1008147	   .185063	  
	   3	   .0676241	   .0194729	   3.47	   0.001	   .0294579	   .1057904	  
	   4	   .1391778	   .0229887	   6.05	   0.000	   .0941209	   .1842348	  
	   5	   .0873816	   .0194437	   4.49	   0.000	   .0492726	   .1254906	  
	   6	   .0164322	   .02169	   0.76	   0.449	   -­‐.0260794	   .0589438	  
	   7	   .0489972	   .0404399	   1.21	   0.226	   -­‐.0302636	   .128258	  
	  
	   2	   .1477645	   .0228019	   6.48	   0.000	   .1030735	   .1924554	  
	   3	   .0928149	   .0201964	   4.60	   0.000	   .0532306	   .1323991	  
	   4	   .1464326	   .0231362	   6.33	   0.000	   .1010864	   .1917788	  
	   5	   .0798057	   .0201897	   3.95	   0.000	   .0402347	   .1193768	  
	   6	   .0123007	   .023742	   0.52	   0.604	   -­‐.0342327	   .0588341	  
	   7	   .0966498	   .0499225	   1.94	   0.053	   -­‐.0011966	   .1944961	  
 
Tab. 19 The association between cannabis consumption in the last 30 days and family 
wealth (esp39) 
	   	   Coeff.	   Std.	  Err.	   z	   P>|z|	   [95%	  Conf.	  Int]	  
esp39	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
	   2	   -­‐.0160004	   .0261963	   -­‐0.61	   0.541	   -­‐.0673441	   .0353433	  
	   3	   .0559679	   .0232128	   2.41	   0.016	   .0104717	   .1014641	  
	   4	   .0255085	   .0221087	   1.15	   0.249	   -­‐.0178237	   .0688407	  
	   5	   .157575	   .0276531	   5.70	   0.000	   .1033759	   .2117741	  
	   6	   .2579938	   .0464611	   5.55	   0.000	   .1669317	   .3490558	  
	   7	   .4441402	   .0623967	   7.12	   0.000	   .321845	   .5664354	  
 
Illicit drugs other than cannabis 
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Tab.20 
 Average Males Females 
Lifetime Consumption 
Students replying that they have used any illicit drug 
other than marijuana at least once during their lifetime 
 
7% 
 
8% 
 
6% 
% of students replying that they have used at least once 
 
Recent Consumption of Ecstasy 
 
- Students replying that they have used ecstasy at 
least once during the last 12 months 
 
- Students replying that they have used ecstasy at 
least once during the last 30 days 
 
 
 
 2% 
 
 
1% 
 
 
3% 
 
 
2% 
 
 
2% 
 
 
1% 
 
 
Fig. 23 Recent use of drugs other than Cannabis by country 
 
 
0	   0,5	   1	   1,5	   2	   2,5	   3	   3,5	  Ecstasy	  
Cocaine	  Amphetamines	  Crack	  
LSD	  Heroin	  
0	  1	  
2	  3	  
4	  5	  
6	  7	  
Is
el
	  o
f	  M
an
	  
La
tv
ia
	  
Bu
lg
ar
ia
	  
Es
to
ni
a	  
Sl
ov
ak
	  R
ep
	  
Fr
an
ce
	  
Ir
el
an
d	  
M
al
ta
	  
N
et
he
rl
an
ds
	  
Be
lg
iu
m
	  
U
K
	  
Cy
pr
us
	  
Cz
ec
h	  
Re
p	  
H
un
ga
ry
	  
Au
st
ri
a	  
D
en
m
ar
k	  
M
on
ac
o	  
Ge
rm
an
y	  
It
al
y	  
Po
la
nd
	  
Gr
ee
ce
	  
Ru
ss
ia
	  
Sl
ov
en
ia
	  
Sp
ai
n	  
Li
th
ua
ni
a	  
Ic
el
an
d	  
Sw
it
ze
rl
an
d	  
U
kr
ai
ne
	  
Po
rt
ug
al
	  
Sw
ed
en
	  
Cr
oa
ti
a	  
Fi
nl
an
d	  
Ro
m
an
ia
	  
N
or
w
ay
	  
Ar
m
en
ia
	  
12	  months	  
30	  days	  
	   41	  
We wanted to see what are the effect of the level of education and economic wealth in the 
family background for the consumption of ecstasy and cocaine. 
For ecstasy, we can see in Tab.2 that higher levels of education and of economic wealth have 
a negative impact on consumption. For cocaine (Tab.22), things are slightly different, since 
we can observe that in general all levels of education have a negative impact, while for wealth 
lower levels clearly have a positive effect on consumption. 
 
Tab.21 Association between ecstasy use in the last 12 months and father education 
(esp37), mother education (esp38), family wealth (esp39) 
	   	   Coeff.	   Std.	  Err.	   z	   P>|z|	   [95%	  Conf.	  Int]	  
esp37	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
	   2	   -­‐.0339836	   .036952	   -­‐0.92	   0.358	   -­‐.1064083	   .038441	  
	   3	   -­‐.1324081	   .0335593	   -­‐3.95	   0.000	   -­‐.1981832	   -­‐.0666331	  
	   4	   -­‐.1199762	   .041388	   -­‐2.90	   0.004	   -­‐.2010951	   -­‐.0388572	  
	   5	   -­‐.1416034	   .0336968	   -­‐4.20	   0.000	   -­‐.2076479	   -­‐.075559	  
	   6	   -­‐.073203	   .0369587	   -­‐1.98	   0.048	   -­‐.1456407	   -­‐.0007653	  
	   7	   .0143655	   .0674989	   0.21	   0.831	   -­‐.1179298	   .1466608	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
esp38	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
	   2	   .0342683	   .040122	   0.85	   0.393	   -­‐.0443693	   .1129059	  
	   3	   -­‐.0648975	   .0358134	   -­‐1.81	   0.070	   -­‐.1350905	   .0052956	  
	   4	   -­‐.0540678	   .042088	   -­‐1.28	   0.199	   -­‐.1365588	   .0284233	  
	   5	   -­‐.0590648	   .0357217	   -­‐1.65	   0.098	   -­‐.1290782	   .0109485	  
	   6	   -­‐.0099472	   .0414066	   -­‐0.24	   0.810	   -­‐.0911026	   .0712082	  
	   7	   .2866878	   .0744702	   3.85	   0.000	   .1407288	   .4326468	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
esp39	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
	   2	   -­‐.2113046	   .0387126	   -­‐5.46	   0.000	   -­‐.2871799	   -­‐.1354292	  
	   3	   -­‐.3396592	   .0345424	   -­‐9.83	   0.000	   -­‐.4073612	   -­‐.2719573	  
	   4	   -­‐.4351388	   .0322882	   -­‐13.48	   0.000	   -­‐.4984226	   -­‐.371855	  
	   5	   -­‐.2306514	   .0433356	   -­‐5.32	   0.000	   -­‐.3155877	   -­‐.1457151	  
	   6	   .0723647	   .0677042	   1.07	   0.285	   -­‐.0603331	   .2050626	  
	   7	   .4773963	   .0787069	   6.07	   0.000	   .3231337	   .631659	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  Tab. 22 Association between cocaine use in the last 12 months and father education 
(esp37), mother education (esp38), family wealth (esp39) 
	   	   Coeff.	   Std.	  Err.	   z	   P>|z|	   [95%	  Conf.	  Int]	  
esp37	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
	   2	   -­‐.0612551	   .0351475	   -­‐1.74	   0.081	   -­‐.1301429	   .0076327	  
	   3	   -­‐.1363336	   .0316192	   -­‐4.31	   0.000	   -­‐.1983061	   -­‐.0743611	  
	   4	   -­‐.0411958	   .0376356	   -­‐1.09	   0.274	   -­‐.1149601	   .0325685	  
	   42	  
	   5	   -­‐.1231189	   .0315634	   -­‐3.90	   0.000	   -­‐.184982	   -­‐.0612558	  
	   6	   -­‐.0718348	   .0348064	   -­‐2.06	   0.039	   -­‐.1400541	   -­‐.0036154	  
	   7	   -­‐.004867	   .0645286	   -­‐0.08	   0.940	   -­‐.1313408	   .1216068	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
Esp38	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
	   2	   -­‐.0207625	   .0366028	   -­‐0.57	   0.571	   -­‐.0925027	   .0509777	  
	   3	   -­‐.1632788	   .032712	   -­‐4.99	   0.000	   -­‐.2273931	   -­‐.0991645	  
	   4	   -­‐.026628	   .037266	   -­‐0.71	   0.475	   -­‐.0996679	   .0464119	  
	   5	   -­‐.1056169	   .0322594	   -­‐3.27	   0.001	   -­‐.1688443	   -­‐.0423896	  
	   6	   -­‐.0909026	   .0381958	   -­‐2.38	   0.017	   -­‐.1657651	   -­‐.0160401	  
	   7	   .0805829	   .0763458	   1.06	   0.291	   -­‐.0690521	   .2302178	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
esp39	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
	   2	   -­‐.2380117	   .0377283	   -­‐6.31	   0.000	   -­‐.3119579	   -­‐.1640655	  
	   3	   -­‐.3249504	   .0332283	   -­‐9.78	   0.000	   -­‐.3900767	   -­‐.2598241	  
	   4	   -­‐.3789844	   .0309232	   -­‐12.26	   0.000	   -­‐.4395928	   -­‐.3183761	  
	   5	   -­‐.2068781	   .0413372	   -­‐5.00	   0.000	   -­‐.2878975	   -­‐.1258588	  
	   6	   .0781936	   .0655316	   1.19	   0.233	   -­‐.050246	   .2066333	  
	   7	   .5893219	   .0732115	   8.05	   0.000	   .4458299	   .7328139	  
 
 
Tranquillizers and sedatives 
It is  interesting to notice that according to the data the use of tranquillizers and sedatives on 
prescription is on average only slightly larger than the use without prescription and that in 
many country the latter is actually the predominant (Lithuania, Poland, Monaco, Italy, 
Cyprus, Finland, Estonia and Sweden) 
 
Tab. 23 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Average Males Females 
Lifetime Consumption 
1) On prescription 
2) Without prescription 
 
8% 
6% 
 
7% 
5% 
 
8% 
8% 
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Fig. 24 Use of tranquiller with and without prescriptions 
 
 
Use of tranquillizers and sedatives without is much more common among girls in almost 
every ESPAD country. 
 
Fig 25. Gender difference in consumption without prescription 
 
 
VII. Conclusion 
Any attempt to prove or disprove the implications of the rational addiction model goes far 
beyond the scope of the present work.  
What the empirical evidence throughout the decades has shown is that although we do not 
find full evidence in support of the rational addiction model, we cannot either accept the 
myopic models as valuable instruments to analyze these kind of behaviors any more. In other 
words, we need to take into account that there is good evidence that individuals are forward-
looking and discount future costs as well as future utility even when dealing with habits and 
addictions. What most recent studies may show as a critical point however, is that there is 
very little evidence in support of time-consistency and stable preferences. 
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However, this should not make us reject the model altogether, as we have seen that, although 
not all of its aspects are fully supported by the data, many of its core concepts and 
implications are valid and sound. So, as previously said, there is no need to develop a separate 
theory  to explain behaviors that should be studied and analyzed within the rational choice 
framework.  
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